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The Philosopher and the Developer:
Pluralist Moral Theory and the Law of
Condominium
JASON LESLIE*
This paper analyzes the evolving law of condominium from the perspective of the moral
philosophy of property, focusing in particular on neo-Aristotelian value or pluralist ethics.
By combining aspects of traditional property law, corporate law, and municipal politics,
condominium provides a flexible tool for ownership and private land use planning.
Condominium, however, also poses novel and unique challenges to both legal doctrine
and the very meaning of private property. After describing and comparing the pluralist
approach to moral philosophy of property and the approach of its main rivals—deontology
and utilitarianism—the paper describes how condominium is understood by each approach
and analyzes in detail current legislation and court decisions regarding condominium in light
of these approaches.
The paper concludes that courts and legislatures have been alternating between deontological
approaches and pluralist approaches to condominium, with a general trend in recent
developments away from the deontological approaches and towards pluralist approaches.
The thesis tentatively suggests that on the whole, pluralist approaches lead to more just and
equitable results in condominium, and suggests further avenues for study.
Le présent article analyse l’évolution du droit des condominiums sous l’angle de la
philosophie morale de la propriété et se concentre tout particulièrement sur la perspective
néoaristotélicienne ou « éthique pluraliste ». En combinant divers aspects du droit des biens
traditionnel, du droit des sociétés et de la politique municipale, le condominium représente
un outil souple destiné à la propriété ainsi qu’à l’aménagement du territoire privé. Ce faisant,
il pose de nouveaux défis singuliers tant sur le plan de la doctrine juridique qu’au niveau du
sens même de la propriété privée. L’article expose l’approche pluraliste de la philosophie
morale de la propriété et la compare à l’approche de ses principales théories rivales, à
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savoir la déontologie et l’utilitarisme. Il illustre ensuite la manière dont chaque approche
appréhende le condominium, puis analyse en détail la législation en vigueur et les décisions
judiciaires visant le condominium à la lumière de ces approches.
L’article conclut que les tribunaux et les parlements abordent la question des condominiums
en alternant les approches déontologiques et les approches pluralistes et que la tendance
actuelle semble globalement délaisser les approches déontologiques au profit des approches
pluralistes. Cette thèse tend à indiquer que, dans l’ensemble, les approches pluralistes
aboutissent à des résultats plus justes et équitables dans le secteur des condominiums.
D’autres pistes d’étude sont également présentées.
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THE PAST HALF-CENTURY HAS SEEN RAPID DEVELOPMENT of condominium as

a new form of land ownership. In major urban centres in Canada, the ‘condo’ is
now a central feature of residential property ownership.1 Condominium enables
the purchase of an affordable home that has many of the features of a traditional,
unitary lot. However, condominium presents new and unique challenges.
Purchasing a unit means entering into a democratic community of owners with
mutual rights and responsibilities and sharing in the running and maintenance
of a complex. As a new form of property, condominium raises issues about the
1.

See Douglas Harris, “Condominium and the City: The Rise of Property in Vancouver”
(2011) 36.3 Law & Soc Inquiry 694. Harris provides an analysis of the prevalence of
condominium in Vancouver. For an analysis on the prevalence of condominium in
Toronto, see Gillad Rosen & Alan Walks, “Castles in Toronto’s Sky: Condo-ism as Urban
Transformation” (2014) 37.3 J Urb Aff 289 at 289. The authors note that “Toronto has
experienced a tremendous surge in condominium development over the last 40 years
and especially during the last decade.” See Audrey M Loeb, Condominium Law and
Administration, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1999).
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nature of ownership that reflect the increasing complexity of society, its economy,
and its legal institutions.
This article explores the connections between the condominium form and
associated legal doctrine, on the one hand, and the moral philosophy of property,
on the other. Until recently, most philosophical work on the moral justification of
private property rights has focused either on utilitarian consequentialist theories
or deontological rights-based theories. However, in recent years there has been a
revival of interest in neo-Aristotelean “value ethics” and its potential application
to property theory. Condominium, with its community focus and complex
structure, provides a useful case study for examining the explanatory power of the
neo-Aristotelean approach and comparing it with more traditional approaches.
In this regard I draw inspiration from Gregory Alexander, who along with his
colleague Eduardo Peñalver has led a discussion to reimagine property law from a
neo-Aristotelean perspective.2 Alexander and Peñalver outline how “value ethics”
applies to property law generally and consider its implications for expropriation,3
nuisance law,4 land use regulation,5 the right to exclude,6 redistribution of wealth,7
intellectual property,8 and collective ownership in general.9 Here, I review their
approach—which I call “pluralist property theory’’—and add to the analysis by
applying it to condominium property. Additionally, I analyze how court and
legislatures have addressed issues within condominium property and consider
which moral theory aligns most closely with the results.
Part I describes the general attributes of condominium as a form of
ownership, and outlines how it differs from more conventional fee simple
ownership. Part II then presents an overview of the neo-Aristotelean approach,
which I call “pluralist moral theory,”10 providing a description of this family of
theories and comparing them to utilitarian and deontological approaches. Part
2.

See e.g. Gregory S Alexander & Eduardo M Peñalver, An Introduction to Property Theory
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Gregory S Alexander, “The Social-Obligation
Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94:4 Cornell L Rev 745; Gregory S Alexander,
“The Complex Core of Property” (2009) 94:4 Cornell L Rev 1063. See also Eduardo M
Peñalver, “Land Virtues” (2009) 94:4 Cornell L Rev 821.
3. Alexander & Peñalver, ibid, ch 8.
4. Alexander, “The Social Obligation Norm in American Property Law,” supra note 2 at 779ff.
5. Ibid at 791ff.
6. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2, ch 7.
7. Ibid, ch 6.
8. Ibid, ch 9.
9. Gregory S Alexander, “Governance Property” (2012) 160:7 U Pa L Rev 1853.
10. “Pluralist moral theory” is different from “pluralist property theory.” Pluralist moral theory
refers to the general theory applicable to all moral questions, whereas pluralist property theory
is specific to the application of pluralist moral theory to questions regarding property.
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II also explores how the utilitarian, deontological, and pluralist approaches
understand and interpret condominium. Part III applies these approaches to a
number of complex condominium disputes. The analysis reveals that the courts
are using deontological and pluralist approaches in their reasoning. Finally, in the
concluding Part IV, the article suggests that pluralist moral theory can help explain
some of the court case outcomes as well as provide a new, useful perspective
on condominium property. It also suggests directions for further research and
reaches some preliminary normative conclusions about the superiority of the
pluralist approach.

I. GENERAL ATTRIBUTES OF CONDOMINIUM
Condominium legislation swept across Canada, the United States, and a number
of other common law jurisdiction in the 1960’s,11 and is a now central feature of
residential ownership in major urban centres in Canada.12 A recent poll suggests
that condominium is the second-most sought after form of home ownership in
Ontario, after detached fee simple housing.13 Condominium provides a way to
own property in a form that is similar to a traditional detached lot, but more
affordable and suitable for a high-density environment. It enables home ownership
and an urban or suburban lifestyle that is more secure than renting and offers
more flexibility than membership in a cooperative. By contrast to cooperative
membership, each condominium unit can be financed independently and usually
can be sold without input from the other members of the complex.
Condominium subdivides land into individually-owned “units” and
collectively-owned “common areas.”14 A developer wishing to create a new
condominium must first obtain government approval in a manner akin to
obtaining approval for a regular subdivision.15 The developer then files a land
11. Condominium legislation swept across Canada, the United States, and a number of other
common law jurisdiction in the 1960s. See Harris, supra note 1 at 695.
12. See Harris and Rosen & Walks, supra note 1.
13. Sean Simpson, “Condos Rank as Second Most Popular Real Estate Choice for Prospective
Ontarian Home Buyers,” Ipsos Reid (10 July 2014), online: <http://ipsos-na.com/news-polls/
pressrelease.aspx?id=6559>.
14. Under the Ontario Condominium Act, SO 1998, c 19, “condominium” describes the general
property form, “declaration” describes the basic document that creates the condominium, and
“condominium corporation” describes the entity that represents the owners and administers
the property. BC’s legislation is the Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43 [SPA] and it uses
“strata,” “strata plan,” and “strata corporation,” respectively. For most purposes these terms are
equivalent and I will use them interchangeably unless the context requires otherwise.
15. See e.g. Loeb, supra note 1 at 2-1-2-4.
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title “declaration” that acts like a “constitution” for the development. It defines
the “type” of condominium development,16 outlines the dimensions of each unit
and of the common areas, sets out a schedule of the maintenance contributions
for each unit, and provides basic rules and restrictions governing the complex.17
The declaration also defines any “limited common property”18 or exclusive use
areas19 in the complex. These areas are portions of the common property that are
designated for the exclusive use of one or more unit owners, but are not part of
those owners’ individual titles.
Once the declaration is filed, the individual unit titles are created and a
condominium corporation is formed. Initially, the developer is the owner of all
the individual units and the common property, and is the sole member of the
condominium corporation. When a purchaser buys an individual unit, that person
obtains three things: (1) title to the individual unit as defined in the declaration;
(2) an undivided interest in the common property of the condominium along
with an obligation to contribute to its maintenance; and (3) membership in the
condominium corporation.20 These three items come as a package and cannot
be separated. Both individual condominium units and common areas are
real property for all relevant purposes.21 Ownership of a unit also comes with
restrictions and duties specified by statute, in the declaration, and in valid rules
and bylaws that are passed from time to time by the condominium corporation.
Courts have an active role in overseeing the governance of the condominium,
as rules, bylaws, and decisions of the corporation may be found invalid if they
are unreasonable or significantly unfair.22 In Ontario, acts of the corporation

16. In BC there are two types of plans: regular strata plans and bare land strata plans. See Mike
Mangan, The Condominium Manual: A Comprehensive Guide to the Strata Property Act
(Vancouver: BC Real Estate Association, 2010) at 15; SPA, supra note 14, s 1 (“bare land
strata plan”). In Ontario, there are several different types, including “common elements
condominiums” and “vacant land condominiums.” See Condominium Act, supra note 14,
ss 138-44, 155-63.
17. See Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 7; SPA, supra note 14, s 244ff.
18. SPA, supra note 14, ss 1, 73-77 (“limited common property”).
19. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 7(2)(f ). Unlike the BC legislation, the Ontario Act does
not have a defined term for exclusive use areas, but does have a similar concept.
20. Strata Title Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 2 [STA]; Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 11.
21. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 10. In Ontario the wording of section 10 makes it clear
that both individual units and common areas are real property. In BC, SPA, supra note 14,
s 239 states “[l]and may be subdivided into 2 or more strata lots by the deposit of a strata
plan in a land title office.” By implication, a strata lot is legally considered “land.”
22. SPA, supra note 14, s 164; Condominium Act, supra note 14, ss 56, 58, 135.
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may also be declared invalid if they are oppressive.23 Finally, voting rights in the
corporation are generally fixed by statute at one vote per unit.24
In Ontario, the declaration may contain certain restrictions on the nature of the
development. In particular, a declaration may contain “conditions or restrictions
with respect to gifts, leases and sales of the units and common interests”25 and
“conditions or restrictions with respect to the occupation and use of the units or
common elements.”26 In British Columbia (BC), there is no statutory authority
for such restrictions in the strata plan. Instead, the Strata Property Act permits
bylaw restrictions on leasing27 and “for the control, management, maintenance,
use and enjoyment” of strata lots and common property.28 The Strata Property
Act specifically prohibits any restrictions on selling, mortgaging, or otherwise
transferring title to units.29
The corporation has the responsibility for managing and repairing the
common property. The corporation also collects levies from unit owners,
enacts and enforces policies and bylaws, and manages the financial affairs of the
complex. While the day-to-day affairs of the corporation are run by an elected
council, major decisions must be put to a vote of the individual unit owners and
require majority, super-majority, or unanimous approval, depending on the type
of decision. As a separate legal entity, the condominium corporation has the
power to sue and be sued, as well as to enter into contracts, both with unit owners
and with third parties. Under some circumstances, a condominium corporation
has the power to bring an action on behalf of the members of the condominium
corporation. In Ontario, this action requires only majority approval by the
condominium corporation’s board of directors;30 in BC, the action can only
be taken on a three-quarter supermajority vote of all the owners who will be
represented in the lawsuit.31

23. Condominium Act, SO 1998, c 19, s 135.
24. Ibid, s 51; Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 53. In BC, an exception may be made
for non-residential units, which may have a different voting entitlement. See ibid,
ss 247-48, 264.
25. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 7(4)(c).
26. Ibid.
27. SPA, supra note 14, s 141(2).
28. Ibid, s 119(2).
29. Ibid, s 121(1)(c).
30. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 23.
31. STA, supra note 20, ss 171-72.
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A condominium complex can be terminated either by vote of the owners
or on application to court. In Ontario, a decision to terminate requires only a
supermajority vote.32 In BC, such decisions require a unanimous vote.33 Once
terminated, the BC legislation specifically provides that the former owners
become tenants in common of the entire property,34 though on a court-ordered
termination the court has the power to vary this provision.35 In Ontario, the
legislation specifies that on termination the assets of the corporation remaining
after all debts and claims are paid shall be distributed proportionally to the
former unit owners.36
The condominium regime attempts to resolve the challenges of multiple
ownership by altering traditional property rights and creating an organizational
form that has some aspects of property co-ownership, some aspects of a business
corporation, and some aspects of a municipal government. A strata lot comes
with rights, duties and responsibilities that would not otherwise accompany fee
simple title. The purchaser of a unit becomes a member of a community that
can impose duties, levy taxes, restrict the owner’s behavior, and impinge on the
integrity of the lot. In return, the owner participates in governing the complex.
Although it involves elements of both democratic and corporate governance,
condominium is primarily understood as a form of property. Having reviewed
the general features of this property form, I now turn to a review of moral theories
of property and their application to this new model of ownership.

32. See Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 122. With regard to termination in Ontario,
a supermajority is an 8/10 majority vote of both owners and anyone who has a claim
registered against property in the complex.
33. STA, supra note 20, s 269, 272ff. However, recent amendments not yet in force will change
termination to a supermajority vote. Bill 40, Natural Gas Development Statutes Amendment
Act, 4th Sess, 40th Leg, BC, 2015, ss 37-55 (assented to 17 November 2015).
34. STA, supra note 20, s 272.
35. Ibid, s 285.
36. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 129. This implies that on termination the former unit
owners become tenants in common over the property. See Royal Insurance Co of Canada v
Middlesex Condominium Corp No 173 (1998), 37 OR (3d) 139, [1998] OJ No 251.
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II. MORAL THEORIES OF PROPERTY AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO CONDOMINIUM
A. MORAL THEORIES OF PROPERTY

For many years, utilitarian and deontological approaches have dominated
discussions on property theory.37 The pluralist approach, while it draws on
Aristotelean ideas, is a latecomer in the modern dialogue. As such, it is useful
to review utilitarian and deontological theory briefly, then move on to a more
detailed description of the pluralist alternative.
Utilitarian theories postulate that one privileged metric—“utility”— alone
has intrinsic moral value. In some theories, utility is measured in the
subjective experience of individuals, using a variable such as happiness or
preference-satisfaction; other theories use a more objective measure such as
welfare or wealth.38 In either case, a utilitarian moral theory requires society to
take whatever actions and prescribe whatever rules will maximize utility.
Utilitarianism has its roots in the political philosophies of Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill.39 In the context of modern property theory, utilitarianism
is expressed primarily through the lens of law and economics.40 Under this lens,
models of rational economic behavior and human interaction are applied to legal
doctrine, either in a positive mode (to explain why the law is the way it is) or in
a normative mode (to justify existing legal doctrine or make recommendations
for change). Law and economics tends to favour property systems that are
predominantly private and allow for a high degree of alienability. According to
37. See e.g. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at xi; Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) at 35; Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private
Property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
38. Richard Posner distinguishes his approach from traditional utilitarianism by adopting
“wealth” as the appropriate metric, rather than “happiness” or “preference satisfaction.” See
Richard Posner, “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory” in The Economic Structure of
the Law: The Collected Economic Essays of Richard Posner, vol 1 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elger Publishing, 2000) 140.
39. See Jeremy Bentham, “Security and Equality of Property” in C B Macpherson, ed, Property:
Mainstream and Critical Positions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) 39; John
Stuart Mill, “Of Property” in ibid at 75.
40. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 18. The authors state: “Thoroughgoing and systematic
utilitarian analyses of property are largely a product of the twentieth-century movement
known as Law and Economics” [emphasis in original]. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy
also notes that “utilitarianism is, in effect, the view of life presupposed in most modern
political and economic planning, when it is supposed that happiness is measured in
economic terms.” See Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd revised ed
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 490-91 (“utilitarianism”).
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these theories, such property systems are the most likely to lead to the greatest
amount of overall wealth or preference satisfaction because resources will tend to
end up in the hands of those who value them the most.41
Where utilitarian theories ground moral reasoning in a one-dimensional
metric, deontological theories ground moral reasoning in a privileged rule or set of
rules about how individuals ought to behave. In the case of property, this is most
often expressed in terms of a privileged moral right or set of rights that command
respect from others and impose restraints on their behaviour.42 For most such
theories, rights are individualistic. Only a person has rights; collectives do not
have rights per se, although the recognition of individual rights may give rise
to collective obligations or privileges. Moreover, the consequences of particular
actions, rules or systems on the aggregate utility or welfare of individuals are of
either secondary or of no importance. A potential change in property rights may
lead to an overall increase in aggregate utility, but if that change violates the rights
of some of the parties in the system, it cannot be justified.
Deontological theories about property are often linked to John Locke and
Immanuel Kant.43 Locke postulated a natural right to private property in the
products of one’s own labour; Kant saw private property as essential to promoting
individual freedom. Jeremy Waldron usefully describes a rights-based theory for
private property as one that “takes some individual’s interest (or the interests of
some or all individuals severally) as a sufficient justification for holding others
(usually governments) to be under a duty to create, secure, maintain, or respect
an institution of private property.”44 In particular, this definition helpfully
distinguishes right-based theories from utilitarian theories: “[u]tilitarian
arguments do not count as rights-based because they do not usually regard
individual interests taken one-by-one as political justifications for anything.”45
Pluralist theories, unlike utilitarian and deontological theories, do not attempt
to identify a fixed, single value or set of values to underlie all moral reasoning.
Instead, pluralist theories accept that moral questions are irreducibly complex
and involve an open-ended set of revisable and context-sensitive human values.
Rather than providing formulae that can resolve all moral issues, pluralist theory
41. Harold Demsetz, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights” (1967) 57:2 Am Econ Rev 347.
42. It is also possible to frame deontological moral theories in terms of duties rather than rights.
However, most property theory has been examined in terms of rights. See Waldron, supra
note 37 at 64ff.
43. See extended discussion in Waldron, supra note 37. See Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2
for discussions of Locke and Kant.
44. Waldron, supra note 37 at 87.
45. Ibid at 89.
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sets up a framework for identifying and debating moral questions. It envisions
moral discourse as an ongoing conversation and a process of discovery rather
than as the application of fixed principles.
However, pluralist theory need neither collapse into moral relativism, nor
accept that morality is just politics and the posturing of interest groups. The
theory can take seriously the idea that there are objective limits to moral reasoning
that apply universally. At the same time, pluralist theory can recognize that moral
questions sometimes involve complex interactions of incommensurable human
values that may not always have one fixed, objectively verifiable answer.
The main forerunner of the modern pluralist movement is the American
pragmatist John Dewey.46 Modern proponents include Alasdair MacIntyre47 and
Martha Nussbaum48 (the latter in the form of a “human capabilities” approach to
morality). In the area of property, Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver have
adopted a form of Nussbaum’s approach,49 and both Hanoch Dagan and Joseph
Singer have presented theories that are pluralist in outlook.50
While these pluralist theories have their differences, it is possible to identify
four key elements. Not all pluralist theories have all of these elements, nor are
there any necessary and sufficient conditions for a theory to be a pluralist theory.
Nevertheless, these key elements are common to many pluralist theories, and one
would be hard pressed to consider a theory that does not have most of them to be
pluralist. The four elements are:
• Reference to an umbrella concept such as “human flourishing” or
another similar idea to describe the overall purpose of a moral system;
• Incorporation of an open-ended and revisable list of
incommensurable human “values” that both constitute and
promote the overall purpose;
• Recognition of the interdependence of individuals and community,
to the point that the interests of the community as a whole
carry moral weight in addition to that of the individuals in
the community; and

46. See Stephen Carden, Virtue Ethics: Dewey and MacIntyre (New York: Continuum, 2006).
47. Ibid.
48. Martha Nussbaum, “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice”
(2003) 9 Feminist Economics 33.
49. Gregory S Alexander & Eduardo Peñalver, supra note 2, ch 5.
50. Hanoch Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011);
Joseph Singer, “Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society” (2009)
94:4 Cornell L Rev 1009.
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•

Adoption of a context-oriented, “practical reason” approach to
moral questions that involves a low level of abstraction and a high
sensitivity to particular circumstances.
Each of these elements merits a brief discussion.
1.

HUMAN FLOURISHING IN PLURALIST MORAL THEORY

The notion of human flourishing derives from Aristotle.51 The phrase is a
translation of the term “eudaimonia,” postulated by Aristotle as the ultimate
end of the good life. While the term is sometimes translated as “happiness” or
“well-being,” commentators generally regard Aristotle’s meaning more broadly.
Rather than referring to a purely subjective experience, eudaimonia captures an
overall objective state of harmony and can be applied not only to individuals but
to entire communities and to society as a whole.52
Whereas utility is “thin,” resting on the subjective welfare of individuals,
human flourishing is “thick,” involving both the objective and subjective, the
individualistic and collective.53 It cannot be reduced to or explained by a single
metric or a small set of human interests. As used by pluralist theorists, human
flourishing is not so much a unitary concept as a rhetorical device pointing
towards an intuitive feel for “the good.” It is meant to appeal to something deep in
human nature: to that which gives rise to the spiritual impulse, to humanitarian
compassion, and to a sense that there is a rich and multi-dimensional meaning

51. See e.g. Roger Crisp & Michael Slote, eds, Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997) at 2 (“[T]he ancient greek philosopher, Aristotle… has been the main source of
inspiration for modern virtue ethicists.”); Nussbaum, supra note 49 at 54 (stating that her
vision of pluralist ethics, a “capabilities” approach, “need[s] to adopt a political conception
of the person that is more Aristotelean than Kantian”); Gregory S Alexander & Eduardo
Peñalver, supra note 2 at 80 (stating that pluralist value ethics “draws inspiration from
the political and moral theories of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Though it departs in
significant ways from those classical theories, enough debt to Aristotle remains that we will
sometimes refer to the theory simply as ‘Aristotelean’.”)
52. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 81. See also Carden, supra note 47 at 80. Carden
writes: “Aristotle conceived of the virtues as means to and constitutive of human flourishing;
that is, given the nature of man, the virtues are the key to the good life, or eudaimonia.”
53. In comparing the theories of two prominent early modern philosophers working in the
value ethics tradition, Alastair MacIntyre and John Dewey, Carden notes that: “Dewey and
MacIntyre come to much the same conclusion about human flourishing – that the virtues
are constitutive of the good life, both for the individual and the community, since these are
ultimately inseparable.” See Carden, supra note 47 at 101.
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to human life.54 As such, while philosophers can invoke human flourishing as a
basis for moral reasoning and can theorize its contents and implications, it may
be beyond a complete intellectual description.
Human flourishing can be interpreted as an absolute or relative concept.
In its absolute form, as originally conceived by Aristotle, human flourishing
provides a fuzzy but objective backdrop against which to evaluate any human
being and any human society.55 In its relative form, as conceived by some modern
theorists, human flourishing does not have an objective content that applies to all
persons and all societies, but instead is relative to culture.56
2.

VALUES IN PLURALIST MORAL THEORY

Reasoning directly from human flourishing to any particular result is impossible.
Instead, moral reasoning in the pluralist tradition is mediated through values that
capture a specific dimension of human flourishing and render it more precise
in a given context. No single value can encapsulate all of human flourishing.
Moreover, values are incommensurable: they cannot be reduced to or defined
in terms of one another, nor can they be placed in a fixed hierarchy. This is the
crux of the pluralist critique of both utilitarianism and deontology. Following
Aristotle, pluralists generally maintain that ethical reasoning, and thus values,
arise from the practice of ethical behavior and use of values within a specific

54. Alexander & Peñalver note that “[f ]lourishing is an irreducibly complex concept that
is constituted by numerous plural and incommensurable goods.” They also point out
that “Aristotle recognized that there is disagreement about what constitutes happiness
(flourishing), and he dismisses several plausible candidates, including pleasure.” See
Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 81. MacIntyre, with some religious overtones, posits
human flourishing as the goal of human existence or the reason for its being, while Dewey
ties the notion of human flourishing to a complex biological and evolutionary process of
growth. See Carden, supra note 47 at 98-101. For an interesting take on value ethics that
uses the analogy of physical health to provide a basis for understanding human flourishing,
see Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape: how science can determine moral values (New York:
Free Press, 2010).
55. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2.
56. Eduardo Peñalver has expressed sympathies with the relativist approach. See Eduardo M
Peñalver, “Land Virtues” (2009) 94:4 Cornell L Rev 821 at 866 (adopting a view consonant
with the cultural relativism of Alasdair MacIntyre).
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context.57 The need for a contextual approach that incorporates the complexities
of human life takes a front seat in their reasoning.58
Alexander and Peñalver note that “the values… are plural and
incommensurable” and that it is not generally possible to compensate adequately
for a lack of any value by an excess of another value.59 Hanoch Dagan follows
an observation made by Isaiah Berlin that “human life is replete with competing
values that cannot be reconciled and with legitimate wishes that cannot be truly
satisfied. Because some values intrinsically conflict and because we cannot have
everything we want, explains Berlin, “[t]he need to choose, to sacrifice some
ultimate values to others, turns out to be a permanent characteristic of the
human predicament.”60
Importantly, the list of values is open-ended. Pluralist theorists do not
expect a final list of values exhausting the possibilities of moral consideration.
Instead, they rely on the notion of ‘human flourishing’ to help identify the values
applicable in any particular situation, and remain open to adding, refining, and
developing those values as needed. In his description of Dewey’s ethics, Stephen
Carden notes that “[v]alues are objects or events that have been judged worthy of
pursuit or avoidance; thus they too are dependent on the conditions leading to
and resulting from objects or events to be enjoyed. None is universal or eternal,

57. See e.g. Stephen Carden, supra note 47 at 60-64 (comparing MacIntrye’s and Dewey’s
rejections of both consequentialist and deontological theories as being too inflexible
and “rule-based”).
58. See e.g. John Dewey, “Three Independent Factors in Morals” in Jo Ann Boydston, ed, The
Later Works of John Dewey: 1925-1953 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
2008), vol 5 at 288. Dewey states:
A moral philosophy which should frankly recognize the impossibility of reducing all
the elements in moral situations to a single commensurable principle, which should
recognize that each human being has to make the best adjustment he can among forces
which are genuinely disparate, would throw light upon actual predicaments of conduct
and help individuals in making a juster estimate of the force of each competing factor…
In taking attention away from rigid rules and standards it would lead me to attend more
fully to the concrete elements entering into the situations in which they have to act.

59. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 90.
60. Dagan, supra note 51 at 70-71, quoting Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford
University Press, 1969) at 1-li.
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for each is a result of particular temporal conditions.”61 This particularity enables
legal traditions based in a pluralist notion of ethics to remain flexible and evolve
over time. According to Dagan, “law is ‘a going institution’; it is, in John Dewey’s
words, ‘a social process, not something that can be done [sic] or happen at a
certain date.’ As a dynamic institution, law is structured to be an ‘endless process
of testing and retesting’; thus understood, law is a great human experiment
continuously seeking improvement.”62
3.

INTERDEPENDENCE IN PLURALIST MORAL THEORY

Alexander and Peñalver note that Aristotle stated seven times: “a human being is by
nature a political animal.”63 What Aristotle meant by this, and about which most
pluralist theorists agree, is that individuals and communities are interdependent.64
People need a well-functioning society to secure their well-being, to develop a
sense of identity and purpose, and to grow into mature and conscientious moral
actors. A human community obviously cannot exist without people, but at the
same time, people cannot exist, except in a very rudimentary and coarse way,
without a community. How people develop, how they perceive themselves,
and how they set their goals, desires, and preferences are all heavily influenced
by their society. Communities are not just made of people; people are made
of communities.65
Because of this interdependence, pluralist moral theory sees individual
and collective interests not as primarily in conflict, but as mutually reinforcing.
61. Carden, supra note 47 at 53. See also Martha Nussbaum, supra note 49 at 41 and Gregory
Alexander, “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2008-2009) 94:
4 Cornell L Rev 745 at 765. Nussbaum describes her proposed list of capacities as values
as being “open ended,” anticipating the need to “undergo further modification.” Alexander
notes that: “[t]here is amble room for robust debate about exactly what capacities are the
crucial components of human flourishing.”
62. Dagan, supra note 51 at xxi, citing John Dewey, “My Philosophy of Law” in Julius Rosenthal
Foundation, My Philosophy of Law; Credos of Sixteen American Scholars (Boston: Boston Law
Book, 1941) 71 at 73, 77.
63. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 80.
64. See Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 80. Alexander and Peñalver expand on Aristotle’s
conception as follows:
Empirically, part of his meaning is that humans are social creatures and that we characteristically
choose to live with others… Aristotle also means that we have a deeper need to be part of a
political community within which we experience richer and more complete lives than are
available to us either alone or within small family units.

65. See also Stephen Carden, supra note 47 at 81. Carden comments regarding Dewey and
MacIntyre’s conception of the self:
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As noted by Alexander and Peñalver: “living within a particular sort of society,
a web of particular kinds of social relationships, is a necessary condition for
humans to be able to develop the distinctively human capacities that allow us
to flourish.”66 The community does not exist solely as an instrument to advance
the aims of the individuals within it.67 Instead, the health and flourishing of the
community as a whole is itself a matter of direct moral concern.68 Furthermore,
the cultivation of values can only happen in a functioning society. An individual
must be educated so that moral sensibilities, the faculty of reason, and virtuous
action can be learned.69 It is therefore part of the moral project to see that
individuals are shaped properly, in ways that promote values and lead to human
flourishing at both the individual and collective levels.
4.

PRACTICAL REASON IN PLURALIST MORAL THEORY

The last piece of the pluralist puzzle is the Aristotlean notion of “practical reason.”
Moral pluralism is a-formulaic. The application of values to moral questions
For Dewey, the self is a confluence of activities taken up through its environment, especially
its social environment. The self for MacIntyre is not isolated from society either, but immersed
within it. It does not choose to engage in society or enter into a contract to accept its laws;
rather, he says that the self is born within society and is constituted by recognition of
pre-existing social relationships and the formation of new ones. The idea of the self as an
independent substance that stands behind activity to control it is not held by either MacIntyre
or Dewey; both philosophers agree that such a conception is illusory and damaging to healthy
social relationships.

66. Alexander and Peñalver, supra note 2 at 88.
67. Carden concludes that for both MacIntyre and Dewey, “the virtues are constitutive of
the good life, both for the individual and for the community, since these are ultimately
inseparable.” Carden, supra note 47 at 101. See also Alexander, supra note 62 at 761.
Alexander writes: “Community is constitutive of human flourishing in a very deep
sense; perhaps community even comprises humanity (as that term is used by many
understandings.”
68. See also Martha Nussbaum, who argues that “[t]o the extent that rights are used in defining
social justice, we should not grant that a society is just unless the capabilities have been
effectively achieved” (emphasis added) and “[t]o secure a capability to a citizen it is not
enough to create a sphere of non-interference: the public conception must design the
material and institutional environment so that it provides the requisite affirmative support
for all the relevant capabilities.” See Nussbaum, supra note 49 at 37, 55.
69. Alexander and Peñalver, supra note 2 at 82 note the following:
Human flourishing unfolds over the course of a person’s lifetime as, supported by those around
her, she gradually acquires the requisite skills and resources for living well. The virtues necessary
for flourishing are not genetically endowed talents. They are dispositions that one acquires over
time through careful cultivation, nurturing, support from families, friends, and communities.
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cannot be reduced to a simple rule or set of rules that will resolve all potential
cases. As Stephen Carden explains in his analysis of MacIntyre and Dewey,
this irreducibility
runs counter to many modern ethical theories, whether classified as
deontological or consequentialist, which begin from a focus on the individual
and tend to emphasize theory over practice. Not so for MacIntyre and Dewey,
who begin by focusing on organized community activities in the pursuit of
common goods and who seek the ground for morality in human practices rather
than in universal principles of thought.70
The identification of values and their proper application involves a complex
process of reasoning that attempts to balance, reconcile, and promote relevant
values in a particular context. The goal is not to identify one basic principle,
but “to identify a framework for describing human flourishing that, as Martha
Nussbaum puts it, ‘allows for a great deal of latitude for diversity, but one that also
sets up some general benchmarks’ for evaluating the practices that prevail within
a given society as either conducive to or inconsistent with the achievement of the
well-lived life.”71 While there may be certain regularities that can be expressed
as general rules of thumb,72 there is no expectation that broad rules of moral
conduct can be applied mechanically across a wide variety of situations.
B. APPLICATION TO CONDOMINIUM

Each of these three approaches to property theory interprets and understands
condominium differently. Indeed, the very concept of condominium is
problematic for the utilitarian view. Utilitarianism is generally uncomfortable
with any institution that relies on democratic means to determine, allocate, and
define individual entitlements.73 This is because, according to utilitarian theory,
whatever legal rule or structure maximizes aggregate utility is what should be
70. Carden, supra note 47 at 57.
71. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 88-89, quoting Martha Nussbaum, Women and
Human Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 51.
72. Gregory S Alexander argues that there are “multiple ways to reconcile support of rules,
or at least rule-like norms, with a relatively robust conception of the social-obligation norm”
in his particular version of pluralist property theory in the property law context. See Gregory
S Alexander, “Reply: The Complex Core of Property” (2008-2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 1063
at 1064. See also Hanoch Dagan, who shows how a pluralist view of property could be used
to justify a version of the numerus clausus principle despite the lack of a unitary underlying
moral formula. See Dagan, supra note 51 at 31-35.
73. Richard Posner, “The Economic Approach to Law” in The Economic Structure of the Law: The
Collected Economic Essays of Richard A Posner vol 1 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing,
2000) 35 at 45. Posner’s essay exemplifies this skepticism in the following passage:
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adopted. Coercive government mechanisms should be limited to those situations
in which restricting the ability of individuals to bargain freely over their rights
and duties will somehow increase overall utility. Classic examples involve market
failures caused by high transaction costs or lack of access to information.74 The
utilitarian perspective, particularly as it is used in law and economics, leads to
the view from public choice theory75 that a coercive regulatory process governed
through voting procedures provides opportunities for members of the group to
enact measures strategically to enhance their personal welfare while lowering the

Were the legal system systematically and effectively designed to maximize economic efficiency,
the role of normative economic analysis would be very small. In fact what one observes is areas
of the law that seem to have a powerful and consistent economic logic – for example, most
common-law fields – and others that seem quite perverse from an economic standpoint – in
particular, many statutory fields… So long as there remain important areas of the legal system
that are not organized in accordance with the requirements of efficiency, the economist can
play an important role in suggesting changes designed to increase the efficiency of the system.

This passage prefers law that is made by a single expert, such as a judge or an economist, over
the “perverse” economic logic often found in statutes passed by a democratic body. However,
Posner does add the caveat that “[o]f course, it is not for the economist qua economist, to say
whether efficiency should override other values in the event of a conflict.” (Ibid).
74. In more technical terms, classic law and economics starts with the understanding
in microeconomic theory that a completely open and unregulated market will lead
automatically to an equilibrium that is fully utility-maximizing. The role of government
is thus to secure a completely free market through clear rules of ownership. Governmental
intervention in the market itself is then justified primarily when there is “market failure”
because the free market mechanism breaks down due to externalities or high transaction
costs. See e.g. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 3d ed (New York:
Addison Wesley Longman, 2000) at 39-43.
75. James M Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of
Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 1962). The publication
of this book introduced public choice theory. In Encyclopedia of Governance, S M Amadae
notes that public choice theory attempts to use economic analysis to understand the
behaviour of collective decision-making bodies, and “incorporates the impossibility
theorem, holding that if one starts with individuals’ preferences, it is impossible to achieve
any collective expression of the public good or public interest.” See S M Amadae, “Public
choice theory” in Mark Bevir, ed, Encyclopedia of Governance (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE
Publications, 2007) at 765.

528

(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

aggregate utility of the group overall.76 Utilitarians also tend to be skeptical about
the costs of democratic mechanisms as a whole, maintaining that at small scales
such as the condominium, such costs outweigh any possible utility gains from
the resulting decisions.77
The deontological approach fares better for condominium than the
utilitarian, at least as a description of existing condominium law. In particular,
two ideas that flow from deontological theories work well with condominium:
a contractarian approach to rights and duties within the condominium complex,
and a rigid approach to the substantive property rights of condo unit owners.78
The contractarian aspect arises particularly in the formation of the
condominium and the setting of initial responsibilities and entitlements on the
purchase of a unit. A decision to purchase a condominium unit can be seen
as a decision to enter into a multilateral contract with the other unit owners
in the complex. The rights and duties that accompany the purchase then flow
from what the purchaser theoretically agreed to in the declaration. Courts
and legislatures that adopt this approach favour laws that make changes to the
declaration difficult. They also consider the rights and duties of the owners to
flow primarily from the declaration, and the resolution of disputes to centre on
interpreting the owners’ original agreement.
To complement the contractarian analysis, deontological approaches resort
to substantive ideas about property rights. According to these approaches, courts
and legislatures can import rules governing other forms of property directly into
the condominium context without further analysis. Any adjustments to property
76. Henry Hansmann, “Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax
Subsidies, and Tenure Choice” (1991) 20:1 J Leg Stud 25 at 34. Noting that the interests of
unit owners may diverged, Hansmann observes that:
As a consequence, there will be substantial room for outcomes that do not maximize the
aggregate surplus of the occupants. This might occur, for example, when the preferences of the
median member are different from those of the mean, or when an unrepresentative coalition
achieves dominance in collective decision because their opportunity cost of time is low or
because they are otherwise strategically positioned to dominate the decision-making process.

77. Hansmann, supra note 77 at 34-36.
78. For commentators focusing on protection of purchaser expectations, see Patrick A Randolph
Jr, “Changing the Rules: Should Courts Limit the Power of Common Interest Communities
to Alter Unit Owners’ Privileges in the Face of Vested Expectations” (1997-1998) 38:4 Santa
Clara L Rev 1081. See also Terrell R Lee, “In Search of the Middle Ground: Protect the
Existing Rights of Prior Purchasers in Common Interest Communities” 111:3 (2006-2007)
Penn St L Rev 759. For an approach focusing more on traditional property rights, see
Cathy Sherry, “How Indefeasible is Your Strata Title? Unresolved Problems in Strata and
Community Title” (2009) 21:2 Bond L Rev 159.
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doctrine that might help to accommodate the particularities of condominium
should be done sparingly, if at all, and only to the extent necessary to protect
property rights. On this view, appeals to the needs of a community or to
maximizing aggregate welfare are irrelevant.
Pluralist moral theory works differently from utilitarian and deontological
approaches. Where the latter two attempt to provide strict rules or formulae to
determine the “best” or “correct” decision in any given case, the pluralist approach
provides an overall framework for moral discussion. Rather than privileging any
particular value, rule, or metric, pluralist moral theory expects that there will be
multiple, incommensurable values at play in any given moral situation, and that
the best moral decision (if there is one) will be the one that reconciles the various
interests. The theory will also consider the interests of both individuals and the
community as deserving moral weight.
In the context of condominium, pluralist moral theory anticipates a careful
and complex weighing, balancing, and reconciling of the interests of individual
unit holders, the condominium complex as a whole, and possibly of sub-groups
within the condominium. While such a theory could value utility, contractual
freedom and obligation, and the potential wisdom to be found in traditional
property concepts, it would not be confined to such considerations. Additional
values such as community harmony, adaptation to changes over time, collective
purposes and intentions, and personhood considerations have a role to play.
Moreover, pluralist moral theory would support a weaker standard of
judicial review for condominium corporation decisions than either deontological
or utilitarian theories. Under the pluralist model, enacting a new rule or
resolving a dispute engages a complex process of reconciling disparate values
rather than seeking the one “correct” solution. The deliberative, democratic,
and community-based process of discussion and voting, when it works well,
is conducive to this process. It is not seen as a game that individuals attempt
to rig in their favour, or a forum through which the mob can trample on the
entrenched rights of others. Instead, the democratic process can be understood
within pluralist theory as a good way to take a “first crack” at resolving issues
by taking the interests and needs of all interested parties into account through
voting and dialogue. The courts need only intervene when the system breaks
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down and some important value or perspective is sidelined or overpowered
by the majority.79

III. A MORAL THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CONDOMINIUM
DISPUTES
With the foregoing analysis of the condominium form and its relationship
to moral theory in mind, it is now useful to review specific issues and cases.
Condominium disputes bring out the differences among the three approaches
in sharp detail. In this Part, I review several situations in which Canadian courts
and legislators have grappled with property issues in condominium, in contexts
that highlight and further illuminate these differences: the availability of the
oppression remedy, the right to sue in relation to common property, restrictions
on leasing, and dissolution of condominium.
A. COMMON PROPERTY AND THE OPPRESSION REMEDY

Condominium property includes “common property,” areas that are held and
maintained in common by all unit owners through the condominium corporation.
Usually the common property will include exterior structural elements as well as
grounds, hallways, and common facilities. The design of such elements can have
a major effect on both the common areas and individual units within the condo.
Often, these features have different impacts on different unit owners. In theory,
the individual purchase price of a condominium lot should reflect the advantages
or disadvantages of that particular lot. If that is the case, then any difference
between lots should be of no particular concern on either deontological grounds
that the purchaser agreed to the bargain or utilitarian grounds that the purchase
was economically efficient. However, the situation is often more complicated due
to the close-quarters living in many condominium complexes, the lack of full

79. Some attempts have been made to address collective property forms such as condominium
in “mixed” terms, combining utilitarian, deontological, and other considerations, without
explicitly adopting a “pluralist” or “value ethics” label. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A
Heller, “The Liberal Commons” (2001) 110:4 Yale LJ 549 (referring throughout to both
“economic and social gains” from collective ownership); Amnon Levahi, “Mixing Property”
(2008) 38:1 Seton Hall L Rev 137 at 141-42 (explicitly avoiding a “single normative
agenda (such as promotion of efficiency, liberty, or equity)”). Both of these articles focus
on the structural elements of collective property ownership and consider moral or ethical
justifications piecemeal. Whether these approaches could be considered pluralist, or simply
pragmatic, is question for further research and debate.
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fore-knowledge on the part of the buyers, the possibility of mistakes, and the fact
that condominium complexes are constantly changing.
Sterloff v Strata Plan VR 2613 involved a dispute over the use of parking
garage doors. The complex was mixed-use commercial/residential with a large
underground parking area accessible through doors from the east or west. The
units immediately above the east door were residential; the units immediately
above the west door were all commercial, with residential units above the
commercial units. Both doors were industrial-grade parking garage doors that
were not intended for use in residences.
Sterloff, an owner of one of the east units, complained about the noise from
the door, particularly at night. The door had been out of service when he purchased
his unit, so he was surprised by the noise when the door was repaired. Sterloff
requested the strata corporation to replace the door with a lighter, residential
door, at a cost of at least $12,500. The corporation refused, and instead made
some minor structural adjustments and restricted use of the east door to prevent
entering (but not leaving) the parking lot through it at night. These steps reduced
but did not eliminate the noise, and caused increased use of the west door, which
led to complaints from the residents above that door.
The court rejected Sterloff’s claim that the corporation had failed to meet its
duty to repair and maintain the common areas. Instead, the court characterized
the issue as a dispute over how to meet that obligation, and held that the proper
forum for resolving the dispute was the democratic condominium process, stating:
Pursuant to its bylaws, the strata corporation must control, manage and administer
the common property for the benefit of all owners. It seems to me that in carrying out
that mandate, the corporation, among other things, must endeavour to accomplish
the greatest good for the greatest number.
…
It seems to me that if the court is to become involved in the particulars of how
that obligation is to be fulfilled, then rights and privileges of other members of
the corporation may be affected, and accordingly, each member of the corporation
should be a party to the proceeding. In my view, the particulars of the method of
performance of the obligation are more appropriately defined in a meeting of the
corporation, not on an application for a mandatory injunction.80

The court’s statement that the corporation “must endeavour to accomplish
the greatest good for the greatest number” appears on the surface to be a utilitarian
approach. However, the judge never considered the costs and benefits of different
80. Sterloff, supra note 81 at 11-12.
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garage door renovation schemes as part of an effort to achieve the greatest overall
aggregate benefit. Instead, the court deferred to the decision of the condominium
corporation and its democratic process. Such an approach has the greatest affinity
with pluralist moral theory.
The scope and meaning of the “greatest good for the greatest number”
test from Sterloff was addressed in detail by both the concurring and dissenting
opinions in Dollan v The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 1589.81 This case is particularly
interesting because the judgment of the trial court and those of the concurring
and dissenting judges on the Court of Appeal provide clear examples of the
utilitarian, deontological, and pluralist approaches.82
Dollan arose from a dispute regarding windows in a new complex. The
marketing materials for the complex showed a bank of “01” units with windows
overlooking Vancouver’s False Creek. However, those windows also overlooked
the windows of the “02” units in the complex, situated below the “01” units.
During construction, the developer changed the windows in the “01” units to an
opaque “spandrel” style. When the purchasers of the “01” units took possession,
they sought approval from the condominium corporation to change the windows
to clear glass.
Renovations to the exterior windows were a “significant change” to a common
area of the condominium, and thus required the approval of a three-quarters
majority of the units in the complex.83 A large majority voted against the
change–19 in favour and 54 against–so two of the “01” unit owners sued the
strata corporation, claiming that the decision was “significantly unfair.”84
The trial judge, adopting a utilitarian approach, agreed with the “01” unit
holders. Citing the “greatest good for the greatest number” passage from Sterloff,
the court held that the strata had a duty to make a decision reflecting a proper
cost/benefit analysis. In the current situation, the “01” owners had been deprived
of their view of False Creek to provide greater privacy for the “02” owners.
However, the privacy of the “02” owners could be protected simply by installing
blinds. Thus, the overall “cost” of keeping the status quo was greater than the
overall “cost” of converting the windows to clear glass. The strata corporation was
thus required to make the change.85
81. 2012 BCCA 44 at paras 33-34, 56, 346 DLR (4th) 630, Smith JA, dissenting [Dollan].
82. The second concurring court of appeal decision did not engage in a detailed analysis, so it is
impossible to discern which approach was being taken.
83. STA, supra note 20, s 71.
84. Ibid, s 164.
85. Dollan v Strata Plan BCS 1589, 2011 BCSC 570, 201 ACWS (3d) 836.
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On appeal, the BC Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s decision.
Justices Garson and Hall wrote separate reasons dismissing the appeal, while
Justice Smith wrote a dissenting opinion. The two concurring opinions and the
dissent rejected the application of the “greatest good for the greatest number” test
as the appropriate test for measuring significant unfairness. The first concurring
opinion adopted the corporate law test for shareholder oppression. This test
focuses on the “reasonable expectations” of the aggrieved party and asks whether
the defending party violated those reasonable expectations by action that was
significantly unfair.86 Based on the marketing materials, the first concurring judge
held that the “01” unit purchasers had a reasonable expectation of clear windows
overlooking False Creek. Thus, it was significantly unfair for the “02” unit owners
to use their majority voting rights to thwart the “01” unit holders’ expectations.
Presumably, this view of False Creek was reflected in the unit purchase price, and
so the “02” unit holders were depriving the “01” owners of a property right for
which they paid. In the concurring judge’s opinion, the strata could not block
this property right through the democratic process.
The dissenting judge took a pluralist approach, holding that the focus of the
analysis should not be on the reasonable expectations of the “01” unit holders,
but on reconciling the interests in the strata as a going concern through the
democratic process. The issue of the “01” unit holders was properly a dispute
between those owners and the developer. As the dissent explained:
In declining the respondents’ request, the strata corporation chose to maintain
the status quo of the building design. It was under no obligation to remedy the
developer’s defect; it was only obliged to weigh the competing interests of all affected
owners, including concerns about views, privacy, and the exterior appearance of the
building, and to make a decision that was not significantly unfair to the respondents.
That obligation was met, in my view, by putting the respondents’ request before all
the owners for a 3/4 vote and then giving effect to the outcome of that vote.87

This passage displays two common themes of pluralist approaches: the
need to weigh and consider multiple values and interests, and deference to the
democratic process. Effectively, the dissent refused to convert the contractual
expectations of the “01” unit purchasers into an in rem property right enforceable
against the world, and instead placed a priority on the need for balancing and
community integrity in a condominium development.
The first concurring opinion in Dollan takes a deontological approach,
while the dissenting opinion takes a pluralist approach. A second concurring
86. Dollan, supra note 83 at para 30.
87. Ibid at para 64.
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opinion held for the “01” owners without providing a detailed justification. The
precedential value of Dollan is thus uncertain. The first concurring opinion makes
several dramatic innovations by applying the corporate shareholder oppression
test and elevating the status of the purchaser’s expectations to in rem property
rights. It remains to be seen whether later cases will adopt these innovations.
Unlike BC, Ontario’s legislation specifically authorizes an “owner,
a corporation, a declarant or a mortgagee of a unit owner” to bring an action
for conduct that “is or threatens to be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the
applicant or unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant.”88 This oppression
remedy is separate from the provisions permitting a party to bring an action to
strike down a condominium rule or bylaw for being unreasonable. In McKinstry
v York Condominium Corporation No 472,89 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
held that this provision incorporated the shareholder oppression remedy from
corporate law, stating:
Stakeholders may apply to protect their legitimate expectations from conduct that
is unlawful or without authority, and even from conduct that may be technically
authorized and ostensibly legal. The only prerequisite to the court’s jurisdiction to
fashion a remedy is that the conduct must be or threaten to be oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial to the applicant, or unfairly disregard the interests of the applicant.…
It must be remembered that the section protects legitimate expectations and not
individual wish lists, and that the court must balance the objectively reasonable
expectations of the owner with the condominium board’s ability to exercise judgment
and secure the safety, security and welfare of all owners and the condominium’s
property and assets.90

The court’s description of the oppression remedy in McKinstry appears
to be more flexible than that described in Dollan. While the Ontario court
acknowledged that the oppression remedy is based on protecting legitimate
expectations, it also specified that those expectations must be balanced against
the corporation’s interest in the welfare and governance of the condominium.
The court held that the owners of a unit who had been blocked from unit
renovations were not entitled to an oppression remedy, even though they were
halfway through the renovations when the decision was made, had received the
building manager’s assent to the renovations, and had relied on the fact that
interior walls were not specified in the declaration as an indication that interior
renovations would normally be allowed. The court found that the interests of the
88. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 135.
89. (2003), 68 OR (3d) 577, 15 RPR (4th) 181 (Sup Ct J).
90. Ibid at para 33.
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collective in noise control between units, and the fact that the renovations would
put the owner’s living room beneath the bedroom of the unit above supported
the corporation’s decision.
McKinstry has been frequently cited by the Ontario courts in oppression
cases.91 In Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No 1272 v Beach
Development (Phase II) Corporation, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that
the section 135 remedy is “similar” to the oppression remedy from corporate law,
but did not analyze the provision in detail.92 It remains to be seen whether the
Ontario courts will interpret the oppression remedy in the strict, deontological
fashion applied by the concurring opinion in Dollan, or whether they will take a
more flexible, pluralist approach as suggested by McKinstry.
B. RIGHTS TO SUE OVER COMMON PROPERTY

Disputes have also arisen over whether individual owners have a right to bring
legal action with regard to common property. Recent decisions from Ontario and
BC exhibit a tendency towards a deontological approach when dealing with the
right of an individual unit owner to seek such legal redress.
The issue first arose in BC in Hamilton v Ball, a “leaky condo” case in which
a group of owners sued another group of owners in the same complex. The
first group claimed that the second group had engaged in improper conduct in
attempting to arrange for repairs and renovation of the building. The plaintiffs
originally attempted to bring a lawsuit in the name of the strata corporation
itself, but they were unable to obtain a three-quarter membership vote to approve
the action as required under section 171 of the Act.93 Instead, the plaintiffs
commenced an action as co-owners of the common areas in the strata, seeking
compensation for the damages that the second group of owners had caused to
their individual interests in that common property.
The defendants applied to have the action dismissed on the grounds that
section 171 provided the only vehicle for bringing an action in respect of the
strata’s common property. The chambers judge agreed:
[T]he entire scheme of the Strata Property Act is based on the fact that strata
properties involve collective as well as individual rights…
91. See e.g. Durham Condominium Corporation No 90 v Moore, 2010 ONSC 5301, 192 ACWS
(3d) 1371; 1240233 Ontario Inc v York Region Condominium Corporation #852, [2009] 57
BLR (4th) 88, 2009 CanLII 1.
92. 2011 ONCA 667, 208 ACWS (3d) 211 (where the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s
decision denying a finding of oppression in that case).
93. SPA, supra note 14, s 171(2).
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It must be assumed, as the legislature has assumed, that reasonable people
protecting their own interests and acting collectively are in the best position to
make a decision as to whether or not a certain course of action is warranted given
the risks and potential benefits of that course of action. In this case the plaintiffs
having been unable to persuade their fellow owners to pursue this course of action
against some of their former or present fellow owners must abide, in my view,
by the decision made.94
In this view, the role of section 171 is to reconcile collective and individual
interests. The strata is the representative of the collective interests, and the common
property is part of those collective interests. An individual owner can influence
the collective decision-making process through voting and other political means,
but cannot unilaterally take charge of an issue affecting the whole complex by
commencing litigation. The judge also cited an earlier case that applied the rule
in Foss v Harbottle95 to strata corporations, perceiving individual units owners as
legally separate from the strata as a whole.96
The BC Court of Appeal disagreed. Noting that the common property
in a strata is owned in common by the individual owners, not by the strata
corporation, the court concluded that Foss v Harbottle was inapplicable.97 Further,
the court held that even though collective ownership of common areas is “a type
of property unknown to the common law,” it nevertheless carries with it the
individual right to sue for damage to the common property “as a common law
incident of the ownership of property.”98 Only very clear language in the SPA
could remove such a “common law incident.” On this standard, section 171 did
not displace the individual right to sue, but simply added the possibility of using
the strata corporation as a representative body for the individual owners’ interests.
Different concerns motivated each of these decisions. The chambers judge
was concerned with the collective resolution of contentious issues within the
corporation, and saw the three-quarter voting rule as a means to promote
harmony within the community by blocking divisive court action without the
support of a supermajority of owners. The BC Court of Appeal focused on the
“traditional” entitlement of individual owners without considering collective
well-being and the particular context of condominium ownership.
94. Hamilton, supra note 95 at paras 25-26.
95. (1843), 67 ER 189, 2 Hare 461 (establishing that a corporate shareholder cannot sue
individually for a wrong done to the corporation).
96. Ang v Spectra Management Services Ltd, 2002 BCSC 1544, 117 ACWS (3d) 830.
97. Hamilton, supra note 95 at para 26.
98. Ibid at para 27.
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This case highlights the tension in condominium cases between “traditional”
rights of property and the “new” property arrangements in condominium. The
trial judge adopted a remedial and contextual approach to interpreting the
rights in a condominium, which are at root creations of a statutory scheme.
This approach resonates with pluralist moral theory because it attempts to
balance the various interests at play in a condominium complex and considers
the needs of the community as a whole. For its part, the BC Court of Appeal
adopted a mechanical approach, using property concepts without tailoring them
to condominium. This approach resonates with deontological property theory
because it focuses on the expectations that parties bring to a conflict grounded in
property or contractual norms, and emphasizes the owner’s rights—often at the
expense of collective interests.
The Ontario Court of Appeal came to a more nuanced conclusion in
1420041 Ontario Inc v 1 King West Inc.99 In this case, a company pre-purchased
several commercial units in a condominium complex and obtained commitments
from the developer to alter the design specifications of the individual units
and some of the adjoining common areas as part of the purchase agreement.
When the developer failed to meet those commitments, the company sued for
specific performance. The developer claimed that the unit owner could not
bring an individual claim relating to the common areas, citing section 23 of the
Condominium Act,100 which authorizes a condominium corporation to bring legal
proceedings on behalf of the condominium owners (although without requiring
a three-quarter membership vote to authorize the action as in BC).
The Court of Appeal found for the unit owner, though on narrower grounds
than those used by the BC court in Hamilton:
What s. 23 is designed to do, in my opinion, is to empower a condominium
corporation to bring an action where there is a “common” condominium issue to be
addressed—where, as Rosenberg J.A. put it in Wellington [at p. 19 O.R.], “the real
injury is to the owners as a group rather than to any individual” (emphasis added).
Such a remedy, broad as it is, is not inconsistent with the right of an individual unit
owner to pursue contractual or other claims that are unique to the owner’s unit,
including those touching on common elements that immediately pertain to the unit
and that do not concern the owners as a group.101

On the surface, this decision resembles the BC Court of Appeal’s holding
in Hamilton. The court found that the provision allowing a condominium
99. 2012 ONCA 249, 349 DLR (4th) 97 [1 King West].
100. Supra note 14, s 23.
101. 1 King West, supra note 102 at para 21.
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corporation to sue regarding the common areas did not prevent the individual
owner from bringing a similar action. However, unlike in Hamilton, the court
considered the fact that the common elements at issue “immediately pertained” to
the individual units and the owner was suing for specific performance rather than
damages. It left the door open for a future case to decide whether a claim can be
brought by an individual owner if “the real injury is to the owners as a group.”102
The issue of an individual owner’s right to sue has significant implications
for the nature of property in a condominium. Curtailing the right of an
individual owner to sue regarding common property, either absolutely or when
the “real injury is to the owners as a group,” promotes communal stewardship
and decision-making for the common property over the piecemeal interests of
individual owners. It places responsibility for the common areas at the community
level and recognizes that taking legal action has an impact on the social and
financial integrity of the entire complex. Such an approach is readily justified
under a pluralist theory, which demands consideration of both individual and
community interests in determining property rights. It struggles, however, under
a deontological approach, as it empowers the collective to interfere with the
ability of individual owners to advance and protect their property rights.
C. LEASING RESTRICTIONS

The ability to lease condominium property to third parties has often been
construed by the courts as a traditional incident of property ownership. At the
same time, there has been a push by many condominium owners to restrict
leasing of units. Lessors are often seen as less invested in the community of the
condominium and responsible for additional costs, while investor-owners are
portrayed as being distant from the complex and having interests at odds with
those of owner-occupiers.103 Earlier court decisions protecting the right to lease
have been gradually giving way to legislation and court decisions that permit
leasing restrictions.

102. Ibid.
103. See Randy Lippert, “Governing Condominiums and Renters with Legal Knowledge Flows
and External Institutions” (2012) 34:3 Law & Pol’y 263 at 268. Randy Lippert summarizes
this widely-held as follows:
By their mere presence renters call into doubt the condominium ideal, which is premised
on owners sharing and governing common spaces together in a stable ‘community.’
Renters are a discursive affront to the possibility of the condominium due to their
assumed disregard for the nobility of home ownership and lack of care for property.
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The classic case in Ontario is Re Peel Condominium Corporation No. 11 and
Caroe,104 where the condominium’s declaration restricted occupancy of each unit
to the owner’s family. However, several unit owners leased units to non-family
members. The condominium board attempted to evict the tenants and obtain
an order prohibiting the owners from leasing the units. The court held that
“[o]ne of the fundamental incidents of ownership is the right to alienate the
property that one owns,”105 tracing the origin of this idea to the Statute Quia
Emptores, an English law passed in 1290.106 The Condominium Act provided that
a declaration could contain “provisions respecting the occupation and use of
the units and common elements.”107 However, the court determined that this
language was not clear enough to permit a declaration to contain restrictions on
leasing an individual unit.
It is unclear why the court did not refer to another subsection in the
Condominium Act that deals specifically with restrictions on leasing. Subsection
7(2)(c) provides that the declaration may contain “conditions or restrictions
with respect to gifts, leases and sales of the units and common interests.”108 In
any event, the Court’s narrow interpretation highlights the difference between
a deontological view and a pluralist one. On a rights-based view of property,
restrictions on alienation or leasing are difficult to justify because they restrict
the power and freedom of property owners. Only a strong contractarian view
could support such restrictions. However, the court in Caroe rejected this view,
holding that the declaration of a condominium complex could not validly create
restrictions on leasing.
A pluralist view of property allows greater scope for leasing restrictions
without mandating a single, blanket rule. From one perspective, restrictions
on leasing could contribute to community well-being by promoting residential
stability and a sense of investment in the community.109 Restrictions could also
relieve a condominium corporation from involving absentee investor-owners
when making decisions. However, restricting rentals reduces the options of
individual owners. Allowing rentals could also contribute to the community by
bringing in people whose socio-economic status makes them unable to purchase
a unit. On a pluralist approach, these various factors could be balanced in the
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

(1974), 4 OR (2d) 543, 48 DLR (3d) 503 (SC).
Ibid.
18 Edw I, c 1.
Condominium Act, RSO 1970, c 77, s 3(2)(c).
Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 7(4)(c).
See Lippert, supra note 106. Lippert discusses how negative attitudes towards condominium
renters has turned them into a type of “other” in condominium governance.
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context of a particular complex, and a solution could be tailored to that complex.
This approach would avoid the one-size-fits-all solution suggested by Caroe.
More recently, courts in Ontario have been moving towards such a nuanced,
context-sensitive approach regarding restrictions on short-term leasing. In Skyline
Executive Properties Inc v Metro Toronto Condominium Corporation No 1280,
a condominium declaration restricted occupancy of each unit to a single family.110
The condominium corporation also enacted rules prohibiting the leasing of units
for an initial period of less than one year. Skyline purchased several units in the
complex, started using them as part of its short-term hotel leasing business, and
brought a court action to declare the leasing restrictions invalid. Breaking from
Caroe, the court did not analyze Skyline’s application in terms of the traditional
incidents of ownership or fundamental rights of alienation. Instead, the court
considered whether the restrictions on leasing conformed with the provision
in the declaration that the units were restricted to single-family residential use,
and deferred to the corporation’s role in “balancing the private and communal
interests of the unit holders.”111 The court upheld the leasing restrictions.
A similar situation occurred in Metropolitan Toronto Condominium
Corporation No 1170 v Zeidan, where an individual purchased several units
in a condominium and then leased those units to a hotel company for use as
short-term rentals.112 The condominium declaration specified that nearly all
units in the complex, including all those at issue in the case, were to be used
as “residential dwelling units.” The condominium corporation enacted a
rule prohibiting any lease for fewer than three months. The individual lessor
challenged this rule. Again, the court did not analyze the issue in terms of the
traditional rights of property. Instead it considered whether the rule was validly
enacted under the Condominium Act, which requires that condominium rules
must either “promote the safety, security or welfare of the owners and of the
property and assets of the corporation”113 or “prevent unreasonable interference
with the use and enjoyment of the common elements, the units or the assets of
the corporation.”114 Rules must also be “reasonable” and consistent with the Act,
declaration, and bylaws.115 The court held that the condominium corporation
had demonstrated that the disruption caused by short-term tenants justified
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

253 DLR (4th) 656, [2001] OJ No 3512 (QL) (Sup Ct) [Skyline].
Skyline, supra note 113 at para 16.
(2001), 106 ACWS (3d) 760, 43 RPR (3d) 78 (Ont Sup Ct) [Zeidan].
Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 58(1)(a).
Ibid, s 58(1)(b).
Ibid, s 58(2).
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taking action to restrict such leasing and that the condominium corporation
was entitled to “considerable deference” in determining the appropriate rules for
dealing with such disruptions.116 Again, the court upheld the leasing restrictions.
Both of these decisions on short-term leasing follow a pluralist approach.
Rather than confining the analysis to individual property rights, both courts
considered the character of the developments, the limited nature of leasing
restrictions, and evidence regarding the disruption, increased costs, and altered
nature of the community caused by the short-term rentals. The court also gave
deference to the condominium corporation and the results of the democratic
process. Rather than seeing these restrictions as incursions on the narrow
property rights of individual owners, the courts saw them as enhancing the value
of the complex and enabling the owners to create the residential community
contemplated in the declarations.
In British Columbia, the courts were initially skeptical of restrictions on
leasing. Earlier versions of the legislation permitted a strata corporation to limit
the number of units in the complex that could be leased,117 but the courts held
that the use of the word “limit” precluded an absolute restriction on leasing.118
The courts in these cases shared the concerns in Caroe: The condominium statute
should be strictly interpreted to favour “traditional” rights of property.
However, under the new Strata Property Act (1998) the BC legislature
provided that a strata can prohibit all leasing of residential units,119 subject to
several narrow exemptions for hardship,120 family members,121 and existing tenants
when a new restriction is passed.122 The new regime in BC rejects the courts’
earlier “property rights first” approach. By expressly permitting prohibitions on
most leasing activity, the legislature has enabled strata complexes to tailor leasing
to their particular needs. Such flexibility corresponds to a pluralist vision of
property rights, balancing the interests of individuals and community.
The exemptions are also illustrative. Each identifies a situation where
the interests of the individual owner or tenant will generally outweigh the
interest of the collective. The exemption for hardship recognizes that, in some
circumstances, owners may be forced to rent out their units to make ends meet.
116. Zeidan, supra note 115 at para 44.
117. Condominium Act, RSBC 1996, c 64, as repealed by SPA, supra note 14, s 294.
118. For a detailed summary of these cases, see Marshall v Strata Plan No NW 2584 (1996),
27 BCLR (3d) 70 at paras 37-44, 64 ACWS (3d) 1070.
119. SPA, supra note 14, s 141.
120. Ibid, s 144.
121. Ibid, s 142.
122. Ibid, s 143.
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The exemption is not automatic, but allows an owner to apply for permission
to lease. While the corporation “must not unreasonably refuse to grant an
exemption,”123 it may limit its duration.124 The need to make an application,
the deliberative process it invokes, and the specific provision that the exemption
may be temporary suggest that the hardship provision incorporates a pluralist
balancing of interests, with the needs of the community and the needs of the
individual owner considered together.
The exemption for family members also involves a situation where the interests
of individual owners are likely to outweigh the interests of the collective. Here,
the exemption is automatic: the strata corporation cannot refuse the rental.125
Unlike the hardship exemption, where the balancing of interests is left to the
strata corporation (within certain limits), the balancing of interests has been done
by the legislature. However, the exemption is narrow and supported by reference
to the value of family integrity and harmony. While rentals to third parties are
likely to be financially motivated, rentals to family members involve complex
dynamics including family stability, intergenerational use of residential property,
and continuity of asset ownership. The exemption for family members seems
to be motivated not by a rights-based approach to property, but by recognition
that residences are often a family asset and that the use of a strata unit within
a family should prevail over restrictions enacted by the relative strangers living
in the complex.
Finally, the exemption for existing tenants allows an existing lease to
continue indefinitely after a strata complex introduces leasing restrictions.126 This
exemption could be justified either by a deontological approach or a pluralist
approach, and is a recognition of the importance of housing security.
D. CONDO DISSOLUTION

One area that has led to special challenges in the context of condominium is
condominium dissolution. Dissolving a condominium complex currently
requires an 80 per cent supermajority vote in Ontario and a unanimous vote in
BC,127 though recent amendments not yet in force will bring BC into line with

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

SPA, supra note 14, s 144(6).
Ibid, s 144(5).
Ibid, s 142(2).
SPA, supra note 14, s 143(2).
Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 122; SPA, supra note 14, ss 269, 272ff.
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Ontario’s eight-tenths supermajority requirement.128 Interested parties can also
apply to have the condominium dissolved by court order if the applicable voting
threshold is not met. Douglas C Harris and Nicole Gilewicz have suggested that
the difference between a supermajority requirement and a unanimity requirement
for dissolution reflects different conceptions of condominium property.129 On the
one hand, a supermajority rule “constructs property to protect its exchange value
for the owner as investor” as it protects the right to compensation, but does not
provide a veto over the sale.130 On the other hand, a unanimity rule “protect[s]
the interest itself for the owner, usually as resident or occupant,” as it does
provide a veto.131 The supermajority rule thus resonates with the utilitarian goal
of maximizing utility or wealth and permitting coercive transactions to overcome
holdouts. The unanimity rule, on the other hand, fits best with a deontological
conception that promotes the freedom and rights of the individual. However,
both jurisdictions allow unit owners to apply for a court-ordered dissolution of a
complex when the voting threshold is not met. This opens the door for courts to
take a context-based, pluralist approach to dissolution that balances many factors
and considers the interests of both the individual owners and of the collective.
Royal Insurance Co of Canada v Middlesex Condominium Corporation No 173
is particularly instructive.132 The case involved a poorly-planned condominium
with both residential and commercial units. Royal Insurance took over the
vast majority of the units though foreclosure proceedings and proposed a
reorganization plan to split the complex into two separate condominiums—one
with all the residential units and one with all the commercial units—and to
conduct a number of repairs and renovations. Nine of the fifty-one remaining
residential owners rejected the plan, insisting on being bought out if the
reorganization proceeded.
Royal Insurance applied to dissolve the condominium and to implement its
reorganization plan. It relied on section 46 (now section 128) of the Condominium
128. Bill 40, Natural Gas Development Statutes Amendment Act, 4th Sess, 40th Parl, British
Columbia, 2015, ss 37-55 (assented to 17 November 2015).
129. Douglas C Harris & Nicole Gilewicz, “Dissolving Condominium, Private Takings,
and the Nature of Property” in B Hoops et al, eds, Context, Criteria, and Consequences
of Expropriation (The Hague: Eleven, Forthcoming 2015). On changing conceptions
of condominium property generally, see ”Douglas C Harris, “Anti-Social Behaviour,
Expulsion from Condominium, and the Reconstruction of Ownership” (2016) 54:1
Osgoode Hall LJ 53.
130. Ibid at 41.
131. Ibid.
132. (1998), 37 OR (3d) 139, 155 DLR (4th) 94 (CA) [Royal Insurance].
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Act, which authorizes the court to dissolve a condominium complex if the
termination “would be just and equitable” and to include in the termination
order “all provisions that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.”
By proceeding this way, Royal Insurance attempted to circumvent the general
rule that, upon termination of a condominium, the entire property is converted
into a tenancy in common.
The trial judge refused to grant the order. On appeal, the majority held
that the relief sought by Royal was not authorized by section 46. The majority’s
reasoning was grounded in concerns about “forc[ing] the objecting respondents
to become unit owners in one of these new condominiums,”133 and in the view
that the power to alter individual property rights would require clearer legislative
authority than the residual power to make supplementary orders on dissolution
found in (then) subsection 46(3).
The dissent took a broader view. It reviewed the underlying interests and
concluded that Royal’s plan was reasonable, better than the status quo, and had
the potential to revitalize the complex:
Because of the fairly recent development of the condominium concept, no body of
law has developed around the problems which will inevitably become increasingly
frequent and diversified as facts warranting termination arise. With considerable
foresight, the legislation has provided the court with a very broad discretion under
s. 46(3) to act as it considers appropriate in the wide variety of fact situations which
could arise on termination. The order requested in this case is clearly in the interest
of all owners, and it would be unfortunate for all if a very small number of dissenters
could frustrate the carrying out of a beneficial proposal endorsed by almost all of
the unit owners.134

Without court approval, Royal Insurance and the forty-three owners who
supported the plan had two options: buy out the dissenters, who were likely to
attempt to secure greater than fair market value for their units; or apply for a
classic dissolution, after which the entire property would be in the hands of the
previous owners as tenants in common. The dissenting judge concluded that
neither of these alternatives was fair or realistic.
The judges in the majority grounded their decision firmly in deontological
concerns. For them, ordering the holdout owners into the restructuring plan
would force them to accept a change in their property rights without consent.
The majority was not prepared to allow such a change without a clear statutory
mandate. Despite the merits of the proposed reorganization, the logic of property
133. Royal Insurance, supra note 135 at 146-47.
134. Ibid at 145-46.
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rights required the court to uphold the ability of the holdout owners to refuse
reorganization regardless of the consequences.
By contrast, the dissent looked beyond the bare logic of property to consider
what made sense in this particular situation. Considering that the condominium
form was a relatively new development that marked a significant change from
common law estates, the dissent accepted that the termination provisions allowed
broad leeway to fashion remedies that were context-sensitive and not bound to
traditional conceptions of property. Despite the fact that the termination order
would alter property rights, the dissent would have sanctioned the reorganization
plan as being in the best interests of the entire complex.
The dissent in Royal can be understood from either a pluralist or utilitarian
perspective. For a utilitarian, this case presented a classic holdout dilemma in
which a small minority of interested parties hold up a decision that will likely
increase aggregate utility. Requiring the holdouts to conform to the restructuring
plan would likely be the most efficient decision. From a pluralist standpoint, the
case demonstrates a situation where asserting rights under a traditional property
rule was unlikely to promote the overall flourishing of the community. Unless
the holdout owners could demonstrate some specific human value protected
by withholding consent that countered the interests of the other owners in
protecting their investment and revitalizing the complex, the interests of the
other individuals and the greater community should have prevailed.
Royal involved an unusual situation. Issues regarding dissolution usually arise
when some, but not all, of the owners in a complex want to accept a buy-out offer
from a developer. Often, such offers are greater than what could be realized on
individual sales of the units. Harris and Gilewicz suggest that these cases pit the
“owner as investor” who is interested in realizing the greatest economic benefit of
the property, against the “owner as resident” who is interested in protecting the
integrity of his or her home and neighbourhood.135
Two recent cases from BC present an instructive contrast in this regard:
Mowat v Dudas136 and McRae v Seymour Village Management, Inc.137 These cases
involved the rare “common law” condominium, formed not under condominium
legislation but through a complex series of covenants and other title restrictions.
In practice, the complexes were run similarly to statutory condominium, with
common areas managed by a central corporation in which every individual had a
membership. The dispute in both cases involved a proposal supported by a group
135. See Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 132.
136. 2012 BCSC 454, 215 ACWS (3d) 230 [Mowat].
137. 2014 BCSC 714 at para 3, [2014] BCJ No 766 [McRae].
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of owners to sell the whole complex to a developer for an amount in excess of
what could be obtained if each unit was sold individually.
Mowat concerned Cypress Gardens, a complex in North Vancouver with
177 units situated on 9.5 acres. A development company approached the owners
of Cypress Gardens with an offer to buy the entire complex for a sum that it
claimed was greater than the aggregate market value of the separate units. Some
of the owners wished to sell, but a substantial number refused. Those wanting to
sell brought an application under the Partition of Property Act for an order forcing
the sale of the entire property.
The BC Supreme Court determined that only the owners of 54 of the 177
units wanted the sale—less than one-third of the total. Further, a large number
of owners vigorously opposed the sale, and offered many different reasons for
their opposition. While the petitioners claimed that the complex was in a state
of disrepair and that the owners could not afford the necessary renovations, the
respondents claimed that a credible plan was in place to finance and undertake
the repairs. Many respondents also questioned whether the proposed sale price
was adequate, and wanted to see a democratic resolution to the issue rather than
a court-ordered sale. Other owners opposed the sale because of their investment
in the community, because they were elderly or disabled and did not want the
hassle of moving, because they had small children who would be displaced by a
move, or because the amount offered would not enable them to buy replacement
housing in North Vancouver close to their schools and workplaces. Additionally,
owners with outstanding mortgages argued that they would have to pay heavy
mortgage penalties.
The court refused to grant the order for sale. Orders under the Partition
of Property Act are discretionary and enable judges to consider a wide range
of factors in determining whether an order is just and appropriate under the
circumstances.138 In its reasons, the court considered a combination of factors,
some of which have deontological overtones and some of which are more
pluralist. On the deontological side, the court considered that when most of the
owners purchased their units, they did not understand the difference between a
“common law” condominium and a statutory condominium, and likely expected
that dissolution or sale of the entire complex would have to follow a democratic
procedure such as the process laid out in the Strata Property Act.139 Purchasers

138. Mowat, supra note 140 at paras 141-46.
139. Under the current Act, voluntary cancellation of a strata plan requires unanimous consent
from all the owners. See SPA, supra note 14, s 272.
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would have assumed that they were buying a piece of real estate that could not
just disappear under a court application by their neighbours.140
On the pluralist side, the court considered the many interests of the
individuals opposed to the sale. In particular, the court recognized the hardship
of breaking up friendship networks, the problem of leaving families in a position
where they would have difficulty finding replacement homes, and the special
needs of the elderly and disabled people in the complex. Finally, the court noted
that well under half of the owners were in favour of the sale, and it seemed unfair
to displace the large majority of the owners in the complex against their will.
While there are some deontological concerns in the court’s reasoning—
especially regarding the expectations of the unit purchaser regarding the means
of dissolution—the main thrust of the decision is a pluralist balancing act,
considering the many different factors put forward by the parties and seeing the
complex not merely as a collection of property rights but as a community with
families, elderly people, and people with illnesses and disabilities. In part, this
is a function of the Partition of Property Act and the discretionary nature of the
remedy it affords. However, under this discretionary power the court may focus
on the reasonable expectations of the parties, or on the best way for the owners
to secure a financial benefit from their investment. The court chose not to focus
on either consideration, and instead considered the individual circumstances of
the opposed owners along with their connections to the community in Cypress
Gardens and to North Vancouver generally.
McRae provides a useful contrast to Mowat. The case involved a similar
application under the Partition of Property Act, brought by owners of units who
wanted to sell the complex to a developer for a significant premium above the
individual unit value.141 The petitioning owners were concerned that the complex
was in a state of disrepair and that there was no agreement on raising the funds
necessary for renovations. The objecting respondents cited reasons similar to
those raised in Mowat: connection to the community, hardship from being
forced to move, and concern that similar housing could not be purchased for the
price offered by the developer. The principal difference between the Mowat and
McRae was that in McRae, over 90 per cent of the owners favoured the sale. This,
combined with the deadlock on renovations, enabled the court to distinguish

140. On this point, the court seems to be misguided. There is a mechanism for court-ordered
dissolution under the SPA that is similar to an application for partition and sale under the
Partition of Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 284.
141. McRae, supra note 141.
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the case from Mowat.142 The court found that the large majority of owners who
wanted to realize as much as possible on their investments and purchase new
homes could not fairly be blocked by the handful who wanted to stay.
It is tempting to see these two cases as representing the two approaches
described by Harris and Gilewicz: Mowat protecting the interests of the owners
as residents, and McRae protecting the interests of owners as investors. However,
a careful reading of the cases reveals that there is more going on here. The main
difference between the two cases is the percentage of owners who supported
the sale. If the goal were absolute protection of the owners as residents, then
the detailed analysis of the individual owners’ situations in Mowat would be
unnecessary—the mere fact that unanimity could not be achieved should
be dispositive. Similarly with McRae, if the goal were simply to promote the
investment value of the properties, then the raw percentage of willing owners
would not be relevant; rather, the court should have asked simply whether a sale
of the whole complex would provide the best return on the owners’ investments.
By making the percentage of owners who agreed to the sale the main concern,
the courts leaned towards a pluralist moral view of property, and in particular,
towards deference to the democratic will of the large majority of owners and their
vision of the community in the complex.
Perhaps the most informative situation would be a case where there is only a
simple majority in favour of a sale, not a super-majority. In such a case, the court
would not have an overwhelming mandate from the owners as to whether or
not the property should be sold, but rather would be faced with two substantial
factions of owners with opposing positions. The factors a court would consider
on such an application, and in particular those it would consider to be the most
important or relevant, could give even greater insight into whether the courts
take a truly pluralist approach.
In both Mowat and McRae, the legislative voting threshold for voluntary
dissolution of a condominium was not at issue because both developments
were common law condominium. Nonetheless, the courts came to the same
result that would obtain under BC’s incoming 80 per cent supermajority
requirement.143 Further, under the new legislation, any voluntary dissolution of
a strata with 5 units or more must be approved by court order. The court has
discretion to grant or refuse the order and must consider “the best interests of the
owners,” the probability of significant unfairness to owners and creditors, and

142. Ibid at para 40.
143. Bill 40, supra note 131.
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“significant confusion and uncertainty in the affairs of the strata corporation or
of the owners.”144
These amendments were a response to a recent British Columbia Law
Institute report that questioned the unanimity requirement, noting that it is
“out of step with trends in strata legislation across Canada and elsewhere.”145 The
report recommended amending the Strata Title Act to require only an 80 per cent
vote, citing fairness to the majority of unit owners as a major concern:
[I]t is possible to question the fairness of requiring unanimous consent of the owners
to termination of a strata. Maintaining a unanimous consent requirement holds
out the possibility—maybe even the likelihood—that an overwhelming majority
of owners will be thwarted by a minority, which may be as small as one owner.146

According to the report, this recommendation was “strongly supported by
respondents to the consultation paper.”147 The report also recommended that
all voluntary dissolutions be subject to court approval, in part as a means of
protecting dissenters against an unfair sale.148 It remains to be seen how the courts
will interpret the new provisions. They may interpret their discretion narrowly,
overturning an 80 per cent vote in favour of dissolution only when there was a
flawed process or an egregious case of substantive unfairness against the dissenting
owners. However, the language of the statute does require consideration of
broad factors such as the best interests of the owners, significant unfairness, and
significant confusion and uncertainty in the affairs of the strata. The shift to a
supermajority requirement, as well as the need to obtain a discretionary court
order, open the possibility of a shift away from a rigid rights-based approach to a
more flexible and context-sensitive pluralist approach.

IV. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL TRENDS AND THE BENEFITS
OF A PLURALIST APPROACH
Condominium creates many challenges. The foregoing review of legislative and
judicial solutions to these challenges highlights varying ways to respond. The idea
that condominium is a new property form that requires new ways of thinking is
a recurring theme. While the logic of property is engaged, especially as regards
144. Ibid, ss 48, 52.
145. British Columbia Law Institute, Report on Terminating a Strata (Vancouver: British Columbia
Law Institute, 2015) at 54.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid at 55.
148. Ibid at 79ff.
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individual ownership, there are repeated references to the community of owners
and to the need for that community to manage the complex and operate through
the logic of common interests and democratic governance.
No single theory of property dominates. However, there are several trends.
First, utilitarian approaches have not gained much traction. This is hardly
surprising. Utilitarian approaches to property rights, especially as interpreted
in the law and economics tradition, sit uncomfortably with condominium. The
tradition emphasizes free alienability of property and the allocation of resources
though the market. By importing ideas of democratic governance into property,
condominium destabilizes the content of property rights, reduces the ability of
owners to bargain freely, and enables owners to pursue their interests through a
coercive regulatory mechanism.
In deciding condominium cases, the courts do not embark on a
wealth-maximizing, cost-benefit analysis. Decisions regarding the right to sue
individually for damage to common areas are founded on common law property
concepts. They do not analyze whether such actions are utility-maximizing149
and may consider whether the “real injury” is to an individual owner or to
the community without a utility analysis.150 In their article on forced sales in
condominium, Harris and Gilewicz note that while the results in these cases
could be supported by an efficiency analysis, the language of the judicial opinions
“suggests there is more at stake in these conflicts than the efficient allocation of
property interests” and that the interests of the owners in their homes “were not
to be thought of primarily in terms of fungible, transferable objects of value, but
rather as a means to secure autonomous and fulfilling lives embedded within
community.”151 Similarly, the court decisions on leasing restrictions either
prohibit such restrictions on the basis that the right to lease is a traditional
incident of property152 or defer to the democratic decision making process.153
None of the decisions consider utility maximization.
Moreover, one of the major recommendations made by law and economic
scholars is absent. Ellickson has proposed a “regulatory takings” rule for
condominiums, under which any action that decreases the economic value of
a unit, such as a bylaw restriction or a re-designation of exclusive-use common
149.
150.
151.
152.

Hamilton, supra note 95; see discussion supra notes 95-101.
1 King West, supra note 102. See discussion supra notes 102-105.
Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 132.
See e.g. Peel Condominium Corp v Caroe (1974), 4 OR (2d) 543, 48 DLR (3d) 503 (SC)
[Caroe]; see discussion supra notes 107-112.
153. Skyline, supra note 113; Zeidan, supra note 115. See discussion supra notes 113-119.
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property, would give the owner of that unit a claim for compensation.154 Such a
rule would ensure that any decision produces an increase in overall utility; if it did
not, then the cost to compensate the “losing” owners would be high enough to
deter the “winning” owners from enacting it. However, there are no provisions
in either the BC or Ontario legislation to require or even permit a “regulatory
takings” regime within condominium. In the recent comprehensive reviews of
both legislative regimes, there is no mention of a regulatory takings regime.155 It
would appear that policy makers, the courts, and the public in general do not
consider such a regime to be appropriate for condominium.
Second, there is a gradual trend away from deontological approaches and
towards pluralist approaches. This is especially true in the context of leasing
restrictions and dissolutions. In the case of leasing restrictions, the strict
prohibition originally endorsed in Caroe156 was later modified by a pluralist
approach that permits leasing restrictions resulting from reasonable deliberations
by the condominium corporation.157 In BC, the courts originally resisted
restrictions on leasing; however, legislative amendments have clarified that
restrictions on leasing are permissible, with a few narrow exceptions for hardship,
family members, and existing tenants.158
For dissolutions, the older position is represented by Royal Insurance Co of
Canada v Middlesex Condominium Corporation No 173,159 in which the Ontario
Court of Appeal refused an innovative restructuring plan for a condominium
on deontological grounds. However, in more recent cases involving offers for
sale in “common law” condominium, the courts are coming to a more flexible
view, balancing a range of interests and factors in determining whether to grant
petitions for dissolution.160 Also, as discussed in the previous part, the BC
legislature has recently adopted a new dissolution procedure that signals a shift
towards a pluralist approach.
However, the courts have resisted pluralist approaches in two settings:
determining rights to sue for damage to common areas, and applying the
“oppression” remedy. For these situations, the courts agree with commentators
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Robert Ellickson, “Cities and Homeowners Associations” (1982) 130:6 U Pa L Rev 1519.
See discussion supra notes 150-153 and infra notes 182-193.
Caroe, supra note 14. See discussion supra notes 107-112.
Skyline, supra note 113; Zeidan, supra note 115.
See discussion supra notes 122-129.
37 OR (3d) 139, 155 DLR (4th) 94 [Royal Insurance Co]. See discussion
supra notes 135-139.
160. Mowat v Dudas, 2012 BCSC 454 and McRae v Seymour Village Management, Inc, 2014
BCSC 714; see discussion supra notes 140-149.
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such as Randolph and Lee who advocate enhancing protection for the expectations
of purchasers.161 In both Ontario and BC, the courts have interpreted the
legislation to allow individual owners to sue for damage to common areas even
if they cannot get approval from the strata to bring the suit in its name.162 In
Ontario, this may be limited by a judicial caveat that an individual owner may
bring a separate suit only where the damage to the common area has a particular
impact on their unit. In BC, however, an individual owner or group of owners
may unilaterally sue concerning problems with the common property in general.
This position is at odds with a pluralist approach, because it allows owners to
bypass the democratic process with respect to disputes over the common areas,
raising the stakes in a condominium dispute and making harmonious resolutions
more difficult.
The oppression remedy resonates with Randolf and Lee’s suggestion
to protect the expectations of purchasers. While it can be a flexible doctrine,
responsive to context and the need to harmonize various interests, the remedy
has a deontological flavor because it is based on “reasonable expectations” and
designed to block otherwise lawful action taken by a majority. Decisions from
Ontario have taken the flexible approach, but the concurring opinion in Dollan
in the BC Court of Appeal may be a harbinger of stricter decisions to come.
Third, the cases reveal divisions in attitudes towards condominium. Judicial
opinion diverged wildly in Hamilton, Royal, and Dollan. In Hamilton, the trial
court held that individual owners could not sue unilaterally regarding the common
areas, emphasizing the need to promote collective management. By contrast,
the BC Court of Appeal emphasized the traditional rights of property and the
need for part owners to bring legal action to protect part interests. In Royal,
the majority on appeal emphasized the need to protect entrenched rights of
owners on a proposed reorganization, while the dissent showed a willingness to
deviate from traditional property doctrine to ensure the viability of the entire
complex. And in Dollan, the trial judge, one concurring judge on appeal, and
the dissenting judge on appeal all took very different approaches, inspired by
utilitarian, deontological, and pluralist perspectives. These different approaches
highlight the challenges that condominium raises for property and its underlying
philosophical justification.
I now turn to a normative argument that pluralist approaches to
condominium lead to better results. This is principally because condominium
requires room for democratic action in the shaping of rights and obligations, and
161. Randolph, supra note 79.
162. Hamilton, supra note 95; 1 King West, supra note 102.
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in resolving disputes. The case law reveals that while deontological (and utilitarian)
approaches inhibit the ability of condominium corporations or reviewing courts
to achieve solutions, pluralist reasoning accommodates the various interests at
stake, provides a framework to find creative ways to move forward, and respects
the outcome of the democratic process.
Cases where judges have described the implications of the different
approaches to one particular situation are especially instructive. In Hamilton v
Ball, the trial judge suggested that “the entire scheme of the Strata Property Act
is based on the fact that strata properties involve collective as well as individual
rights.”163 The judge was concerned about the ability of one faction of unit
owners to disrupt a difficult and costly democratic process through litigation.
From a deontological perspective, this can look like unfair suppression of the
property rights of owners. However, from a pluralist perspective, this restriction
encourages democratic resolution of disputes and deters a faction of owners from
hijacking the process. Owners opposing court action have property interests
in the common areas as well, and if no clear consensus exists for bringing a
court action, then the supermajority rule prevents a tiny minority, or even a
simple majority, from imposing the cost and acrimony of litigation on the rest.
The deontological approach taken by the BC Court of Appeal precludes these
important considerations.
The approach taken in 1 King West,164 may strike a better balance, by requiring
that unilateral suits regarding common property be restricted to cases where one
owner or group of owners are especially aggrieved by the particular interests in
the common areas. This approach gives individuals the power to take action
when their unique interests are affected while leaving general matters to be dealt
with collectively. Respect for autonomy, privacy, and other values that adhere
to individuals are thus reconciled with the values of community cohesion and
deliberative decision making.
Similar remarks apply to Royal Insurance Co.165 In that case, the majority
refused a reorganization plan on the narrow ground that it would alter the property
rights of a small minority of owners without their consent. And yet, condominium
contemplates precisely that, through the democratic process of amending the
declaration and bylaws. While not all property rights in a condominium need
to be subject to democratic will, some certainly do. To confine the question in a
case like Royal Insurance Co to “Does the proposed change alter property rights
163. Hamilton, supra note 95 at para 25.
164. Supra note 155.
165. Supra note 164.
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without consent?” limits the investigation and ignores the democratic aspect
of condominium property. The better question is, “Does the proposed change
represent a balanced and measured solution that adequately serves the interests of
the individual unit holders and the condominium as collective?”
Disputes such as these suggest how a pluralist approach ought to inform the
enactment and interpretation of condominium legislation. From this perspective,
the onus on the parties to a condominium dispute would be to name and justify
the values served by the institution of the condominium, and then to explain
why their proposed course of action best reconciles those values. In a situation
such as Royal, the insurance company and the majority owners can point to
community harmony, commercial viability, and preservation of economic value
to advance their claim that the Condominium Act should be interpreted to permit
the restructuring. The minority owners can point to the values served by their
position: stability, maintenance of expectations, and autonomy. The court can
then explicitly consider these values and make a decision that achieves a just
result under the circumstances.
The pluralist approach could also impact the way expectations work in
property law, and the understanding of what someone “buys into” when they
purchase a condominium unit. While condominium could be seen as a mere
“community of convenience,” the disputes reveal a more complex character.
A distinction drawn by Gregory Alexander between “voluntary associations” and
“communities” is useful here.166 “Voluntary associations” are groups that people
freely choose to join purely to advance their individual agendas; “communities”
are groups that people may choose or not and are held together “by shared visions
that constitute for each of them their personal identity.”167 Many groups exhibit
characteristics of both. The potential for disputes and the need to collaborate in
relatively intimate settings suggest that a condominium cannot be understood
solely as a voluntary association in which individuals combine for instrumental
reasons only. In a residential complex, individuals literally have to live with
each other. Purchasing a residential condominium unit involves entering into
a community with some sense of shared purpose: to enable each unit owner to
own, take care of, and enjoy a home in the complex.168 As well, condominium
developments are going concerns that evolve over time. Fulfilling the purpose
166. Gregory S Alexander, “Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community” (1989-1990) 75 Cornell L Rev 1.
167. Ibid at 26.
168. Commercial condominiums may more closely resemble a “voluntary association,” depending
on the character of the property and the businesses located there.
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of sustaining a harmonious community may therefore require adjustments,
mediated through democratic decision-making. A purchaser of a unit cannot
reasonably adopt a full-fledged property expectation that all their rights will be
frozen at the time of purchase.
In this respect, the application of the oppression remedy from corporate
law requires particular care. While this remedy began as a flexible and equitable
one that had regard to oppressive and unfair conduct in general, courts in
recent decades have narrowed its application.169 An action for oppression now
succeeds when a minority can demonstrate that they had objectively reasonable
expectations regarding their purchase of property and those expectations have
been violated by majority action that was significantly unfair.170 If condominium
is to survive and flourish, the qualifiers that the expectations be “reasonable” and
that the violations be “significantly unfair” have a lot of work to do. The pluralist
perspective provides a suitable framework to inform that work. In particular,
as the Ontario court stated in McKinstry, “the court must balance the objectively
reasonable expectations of the owner with the condominium board’s ability to
exercise judgment and secure the safety, security and welfare of all owners and
the condominium’s property and assets.”171 Both courts and purchasers of units
need to understand that purchasers’ expectations are only one of many values
to be considered.
Bankruptcy and corporate restructuring is another area of law that might
provide useful analogies or ideas for condominium. In a bankruptcy, the usual
rights of property are suspended and the bankrupt’s assets vest temporarily in
a trustee who liquidates or manages those assets for the benefit of creditors.172
169. Markus Koehnen, Oppression and Related Remedies (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004)
at 84-88 (tracing the development of the “reasonable expectations” test for shareholder
oppression to Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd, [1972] 2 All E R 492 (HL). See also
David S Morritt, Sonia L Bjorkquist & Allan D Coleman, The Oppression Remedy (Aurora,
ON: Canada Law Books Inc, 2004), ch 3 at 3-1. Morrit, Bjorkquist & Coleman state that
“in considering applications made pursuant to the statutory oppression provisions, courts
rely heavily on the evidence of shareholder expectations in determining whether conduct has
been oppressive or unfairly prejudicial.”
170. 459381 BC Ltd v Strata Plan BCS 1589, 2012 BCCA 44, [2012] 4 WWR 475 [Dollan]; see
discussion supra notes 83-89.
171. McKinstry v York Condominium Corp No 472 (2003), 68 OR (3d) 557 at 566, 127 ACWS
(3d) 560. See discussion supra notes 83-94.
172. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985 c B-3, s 5(2)-(3). Also see generally Mr. Justice
Lloyd W Houlden, Mr. Justice Geoffrey B Morawetz & Dr. Janis P Sarra, Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Law of Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2005); Lazar Sarna, Law of Bankruptcy
and Insolvency in Canada, revised ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2005) at 1-2.
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In a corporate restructuring under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act,173
creditors’ rights to execute on debts are suspended while the debtor and creditors
negotiate a restructuring under court supervision, which can result in sweeping
changes to the debtor corporation’s legal structure, ownership, and debts.174 The
elaborate negotiations between interested parties in such proceedings, conducted
with the help of temporary administrators and court oversight, provide a forum
in which to work out flexible and viable solutions. When a complex proves to
be commercially unviable, as in Royal, or where disputes lead to acrimony and
gridlock, a restructuring mechanism might provide the best way forward. The
dissent in Royal recognized this and was willing to read a type of restructuring
remedy into the residual powers of the statutory scheme. Both BC and Ontario
provide for a court-appointed administrator to manage the affairs of a complex
in the event that the condominium corporation cannot function.175 However,
the administrator’s powers are limited and, in BC, the administrator may not
take any action that normally requires a vote without first securing that vote.176
Strengthening this approach by providing express legislative authority for a more
complex restructuring process could prove a very useful innovation. Such an
innovation would also promote a pluralist approach to condominium, requiring
highly contextual solutions that incorporate direct consideration of the values
underlying the condominium.
Both BC and Ontario have recently undertaken reviews of their condominium
legislation. In Ontario, the review process led to a “Stage Two solutions report”
published in September 2013,177 and after further consultation with the public,
to a proposed Protecting Condominium Owners Act.178 The Ontario review
focused on five areas: consumer protection, financial management, dispute
resolution, governance, and condominium management.179 The review was
based on seven “values” that were identified as “essential to building successful
condo communities”: well-being, fairness, informed community members and
173. Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 11.
174. Dr. Janis P Sarra, Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 2nd ed (Toronto:
Carswell, 2013).
175. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 131; SPA, supra note 14, s 174.
176. SPA, supra note 14, s 174(7).
177. Public Policy Forum, Growing Up: Ontario’s Condominium Communities Enter a New
Era: Condominium Act Review Stage Two Solutions Report (Ottawa: Public Policy Forum,
September 2013).
178. Bill 106, An Act to amend the Condominium Act, 1998, to enact the Condominium
Management Services Act, 2015 and to amend other Acts with respect to condominiums, 1st Sess,
41st Leg, Ontario, 2015 (first reading 27 May 2015).
179. Public Policy Forum, supra note 182 at 5.
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stakeholders, responsiveness, strong communities, financial sustainability and
effective communication.180 The reviewers emphasized that “condos are much
more than legal entities. They are self-governing communities.”181 Recognizing
that condominium issues are “not just legal or technical” but “often… are about
relationships between a varied and often disparate group of interests,”182 the
reviewers adopted “an approach based on collaboration and compromise.”183 In the
end, the recommendations in the report focused on consumer protection through
disclosures to buyers, protecting against fraud in condominium governance, and
dispute resolution mechanisms, rather than on property entitlements. In fact, the
report says little about property rights, focusing instead on the need to address
multiple values and to create viable condominium communities with long-term
relationships between owners.
The new Protecting Condominium Owners Act largely follows the
recommendations in the Stage Two solutions report.184 One important change is
the creation of a new “Condo Authority,” an arms-length administrative agency
focused on education and dispute resolution. In particular, the Condo Authority
includes an administrative tribunal to adjudicate a variety of condominium
disputes, including disputes regarding the enforcement of declarations, by-laws
and rules. The tribunal would provide a cheaper and more informal process
than going to court. As a means of promoting harmony through the quick and
informal resolution of disputes, the tribunal is aligned with a pluralist vision of
property in the condominium, rather than a strict, rule-based vision that places
property rights first.
In BC, the review of strata property legislation by the British Columbia
Law Institute (BCLI) is ongoing. The Phase One report, published in November
2012, identifies seven areas to be examined during Phase Two: fundamental
changes to stratas, “complex stratas,” leasehold stratas, common property,
governance issues, insurance issues, and land-title issues.185 As of this writing, the
BCLI has published a report on only one of these areas, fundamental changes
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to stratas.186 Fundamental changes, complex stratas, and common property are
more likely to involve questions about the conception of property than the issues
canvassed in the Ontario review. “Fundamental changes” refer to winding up
and dissolution, amalgamations of strata complexes, and major changes to a
strata plan. Complex stratas refer to multi-use strata complexes, which may have
“residential, commercial, industrial, recreational, or other uses.”187 The review of
common property is to be focused on “perceived uncertainties in the legislation,”
as “despite the essential importance of common property to stratas, there appear
to remain some basic issues concerning its character that would benefit from
clarification.”188 The review of disputes over common areas in this article supports
this assertion. While the BCLI review process is still at an early stage, its findings
and recommendations are likely to engage the question of how best to understand
property rights in condominium.
Looking to the future, it is likely that condominium will continue to
present new challenges to traditional notions of property. One topic making its
way through the courts at present is cigarette smoking.189 Many condominium
corporations in both Ontario and BC have passed by-laws to prohibit smoking, not
just in common areas or outdoor patios, but also inside individual units. Judicial
pronouncements on whether such rules are “reasonable” or “significantly unfair”
will arrive soon. Such cases will again require courts to consider the nature of
property in condominium. A utilitarian approach requires a cost/benefit analysis;
a deontological approach requires consideration of the rights of property and the
reasonable expectations of owners upon purchase. A pluralist approach requires
more. For smoking, this would involve considering the impacts of smoking on
the other owners and the impacts of a smoking ban for those who want to smoke
or are struggling with tobacco addiction. Further, a pluralist approach may not
lead to a one-size-fits-all solution; perhaps the proximity of units, the structure
of a complex’s ventilation system, and the general acceptance of smoking in the
greater community are all factors to consider. The power of the pluralist approach
is that it allows for the entire context of the matter to be taken into consideration,
and a greater probing of the individual and communal interests at stake.
186. British Columbia Law Institute, Report on Terminating Strata (February 2015), online: <www.
bcli.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015-02-20_BCLI-SPL-Ph2-Report-onTerminating-a-Strata-FINAL.pdf>. For the discussion of the report see supra notes 150-153.
187. BCLI, supra note 190 at 20.
188. Ibid at 23.
189. Jason Proctor, “Smoker-rights battle heads to B.C. Supreme Court”, CBC
News (7 September 2015) online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/
smoker-rights-battle-heads-to-b-c-supreme-court-1.3216557>.

